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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



WHAT IS THE POST-WAR ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY?

by

Phil M. Kelly

Lieutenant Colonel Royal Marines

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes. (or appropriate statement per the Academic Integrity Policy)

Signature: Phil Kelly

Thesis Adviser:

Signature: Charles Cunningham 6 April 2011
Cunningham C., LTGEN (Retd.), USAF
Professor of Strategy
Joint Advanced Warfighting School

Approved by:

Signature: James B. Miller
Miller B.J., COL USMC
Committee Member
Head, Operational Art and
Campaigning Dept
Joint Advanced Warfighting School

Signature: J. M. Hinson
Hinson J.M., CAPT USN
Committee Member
Joint Advanced Warfighting School

Signature: Joanne M. Fish
Joanne M. Fish, CAPT USN, Director,
Joint Advanced Warfighting School

ABSTRACT

The coherent employment of political, military, economic and informational instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives describes U.S. national security strategy. Grand strategy, planned and executed using a comprehensive approach, can help define the future role of the U.S. military following the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. This context, coupled with the fiscal reality of a rapidly growing federal deficit, prescribes efficiency. This can be gained by utilizing existing capabilities more efficiently, by allocating authorities, roles and responsibilities more appropriately within the relatively new context of the modern global environment. This environment now includes new domains, most notably cyber, that complicate any assessment, and distribute power further. This distribution of power means that diplomacy is now complemented in international relations by information, another important, if not dominant factor. The rise of the information instrument of power has been impressive, to a large extent aided by social media. The military have a new reality to contend with, not one that limits them, but one that provides new opportunities, while exposing new flanks. Maneuver space is bounded by economic interdependence and the reality of a large federal deficit. The real challenge is how to position, resource and act within the environment that includes new global commons. Any action must be taken cognizant of the values held by the nation, and not unnecessarily compromise the view of the U.S. internationally.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral M. G. Mullen, U.S. Navy, has directed the National Defense University to consider the research question “What is the post-war role of the U.S. Military?”¹ This research responds to that question. The military role is defined as the broad and enduring purposes for which the services are established in law.² Included as a subset of this primary question are the following:

What is the proper use of military force?

(1) How can we ensure military force does not become an option of last resort?

(2) How can we ensure military force is applied in a precise and principled manner?

(3) How can we ensure an ongoing and iterative approach to matching strategy and policy when employing military force?

These questions need to be addressed in the context of power, as the military is but one instrument of national power. The Chairman, in the 2011 National Military Strategy asserts: “Our military power is most effective when employed in support and in concert with other elements of power as part of whole-of-nation approaches to foreign policy.”³

In order to address these questions, this paper will first explore the balance of power from a western perspective, and the method of wielding it. Second, it will discuss the types of power using the hard, soft and smart framework. Thirdly, the instruments of power described by DIME⁴ will be investigated. And fourth, a risk analysis including the U.K. perspective, and a broader strategy discussion will be presented. In conclusion U.S. recommendations to address the CJCS questions are proposed.

¹ “Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Research Initiative for Academic Year (AY) 2010-11,” Memorandum for the President, National Defense University, 13 May 2010.

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, Incorporating Change 1, 20 Mar 2009 (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 May 2007), xii.

³ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, February 2011, covering letter.

⁴ DIME: Diplomatic; Information; Military; Economic instruments of power.

The thesis of this paper is: Grand Strategy requires a Comprehensive Approach to be efficient and effective in fiscally constrained times. It is more than a choice of approach; it is the development of synergy.

What is the post-war role of the U.S. Military?

Grand strategy can share elements with foreign policy, but it primarily addresses political direction of the military instrument of national power. It was defined by B H Liddell Hart as the purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community.⁵ Understanding the evolving future strategic context and the value of alliance or coalition allows a winning grand strategy to be developed. In light of this, the evolving global balance of power focusing on the way the “Western” world wields power is examined first. The intent is to provide the current context and attempt to identify changes in the balance of power, alliances and partnerships.

The distribution of global political, economic, and military power is becoming more diffuse. The rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the world’s largest democracy, will continue to shape an international system that is no longer easily defined – one in which the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.⁶

The “Comprehensive Approach” used by NATO in the Afghan theater indicates that a national strategy incorporating the efficient use of all elements of national power results in a greater sum gain, delivering efficiencies. This approach, which may be considered to fit the description of the combination of hard and soft power into a winning strategy, is related to smart power. The worldwide application of this methodology in support of a strategy would substantially further national interests, and as such merits attention.

⁵ B H Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed., (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), 322.

⁶ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, iii.

That said, the current focus on integration of government departments in the U.S. capitol and the U.K. is fraught with difficulty due to the legacy of a lack of common practice or perceived need, and also the limitation of the separation of the elements of power to ensure a robust democracy. Departmental cultural differences and competition for resources will also endure, but practical cooperation in the field has demonstrated mileage as a concept. What is required at home is a well led decision making structure with a sound grand strategy, supported by a national strategic planning capability and an ability to support high tempo operations.

Fiscal pressure must also be acknowledged, but in this ever more insecure world, focus on securing national security interests abroad should be unwavering. Hard near-term choices must be made in light of broader economic constraints.⁷ These economic constraints are not faced by all nations, with some emerging nations continuing to grow faster than the U.S.. Almost a hundred years ago, Mackinder warned; “The great wars of history – we have had a world war about every hundred years for the last four centuries – are the outcome, direct or indirect, of unequal growth of nations...”⁸

Investment in the future starts with investment in security to allow all other activities to flourish. As stated in the March 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States, “the Armed Forces, operating at home and abroad, in peace and in war, will continue to serve as a constant, visible reminder of U.S. resolve to protect common interests.”⁹ However, in the U.S. the closure of the F-22 fighter production line and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) are only two of many indicators of mounting fiscal pressure on the

⁷ NMS 2011, covering letter.

⁸ Halford J Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), 1. This was first published in 1919 by Henry Holt and Company, Inc.

⁹ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, March 2004, v.

U.S. defense budget. Michael O’Hanlon asks: “Can the United States mitigate the downsides of any hegemonic realignment of global power by more responsible fiscal policy? And what is the true extent of the Pentagon’s ‘fair share’ of any such realignment effort?”¹⁰

The U.S. has yet to contend fully with its changing leadership role and the reality it may face in military spending, but it is in part recognized by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the 2011 National Military Strategy.¹¹ With regard to military spending, the U.S. has significantly different domestic pressures and defense industry culture than the U.K.. As such, looking for insights from the recent U.K. spending review holds some risks; the outcomes may not be common.

However, it is however likely that the U.K. Strategic Defence and Security Review still influenced U.S. thinking on the matter. This particularly applies to the U.K. planned introduction, or otherwise, of a new scale of carrier capability at this fiscally challenging time.¹² It would have been the most significant indicator of long term British national intent to reassert itself as a global power with independent global reach, if it had been presented as such. It was however presented as a contractual obligation that did not fit with the new strategy, losing all its impact. Delaying the capability whilst enhancing current capabilities may be necessary to win today’s wars, but has not sent the clarity of message possible with a positive carrier force choice. It is this that is the clearest indicator of the U.K. favoring the comprehensive approach over a grand strategy with a longer term view of the balance of power.

¹⁰ Michael O’Hanlon, “Defense budget and American power: Careful Cuts can Save Money and Strengthen Long Term Security,” *The Washington Times*, November 16, 2010. Online edition <http://www.washingtontimes.com> (accessed Nov 18, 2010).

¹¹ NMS 2011, covering letter.

¹² U.K. Strategic Defence and Security Review, October 2010.

The future U.S. national strategy, and the role of the U.S. military within it, depends on the choices made in the near term when the fiscal pressure is likely to be greatest. It is imperative that strategy lead the process, optimized by early force structure choices. This should go beyond the traditional focus on military capabilities and include all applicable government departments. As stated in the 2004 National Military Strategy “The United States must adopt an “active defense-in-depth” that merges joint force, interagency, international non-governmental organizations, and multi-national capabilities in a synergistic manner.”¹³

The 2011 National Military Strategy lists three broad themes to advance: first, military leadership is often as important as military capabilities; second, the changing security environment requires deepened relationships with allies and partnerships with new actors; and third, the uncertain future requires a full spectrum of military capabilities and attributes.¹⁴ While the leaders of the military know what is to be done, and have broadly described what they can do, what do they advise the politicians? This is key.

¹³ NMS 2004, 6.

¹⁴ NMS 2011, covering letter.

CHAPTER 2: BALANCE OF POWER

With the end of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan already in part reality, it is time to look up and to survey the world. The development of a strategy to hedge, or even succeed within the future global context, requires a determined attempt to understand the global balance of power. Secretary Robert Gates identifies that tackling common challenges also requires a careful survey of the tools available to construct a durable, flexible and dynamic strategy.¹ Today's strategic context should also be appreciated, as indicators to future state or organizational behavior may be apparent. One significant factor identified by Mackinder is that typically a democracy refuses to think strategically unless it is forced to do so for purposes of defense.²

In order to properly situate this appraisal, inclusion of a discussion on current alliances is necessary. The choices being made between alliances, coalitions and bilateral agreements are good indicators as to their perceived relative value. The difficulties of utilizing NATO as a base structure in the Afghan campaign are still readily apparent. The value of strong bilateral ties between for example, the U.S. and the U.K., allow for positive, responsive action to be taken when required, although this politically benefits from legal and moral justification achieved in international forums.

Strategic Context

U.S. global hegemony – leadership by one state in a confederacy,³ is currently not seriously challenged and is likely to remain so for some time, although this is not certain. Indeed, U.S. hegemony is already being eroded in many regions due to the relative

¹ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, Robert M Gates, Secretary of Defense, covering letter.

² Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 17.

³ The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. "Hegemony."

decline of U.S. geopolitical power. Rosemary Foot concludes that this is obvious when the advance of other nations is taken into account, and that the danger of war is clearly at its height when such a power evolution is about to take place.⁴ Measuring this shift in the balance of power is exceedingly difficult, and very often the measures selected to demonstrate it may not stand scrutiny. However, if the problem is reduced using Robert Dahl's definition that power can be defined as the ability of A to make B do what B would otherwise not do,⁵ then broad changes in the balance of power can be identified.

Even with a pure measure of power, it is more relevant to talk of the will to use it. Richard Haas, when writing in *Foreign Affairs*, observed that in an era of non-polarity, "The E.U. is not inclined to act in an assertive fashion of historic great powers."⁶ This statement identifies the fact that the E.U. possesses a structure and outlook that requires consensus based decision making. This often makes the E.U.'s decision making cycle too long and cumbersome for positive action, particularly when it involves the use of military force. The author's experience with EUFOR Tchad/R.C.A.,⁷ showed that collective action was actually more important than tempo or effect; it was of primary importance to have all flags represented in theater rather than to have military effect. If we consider the classical elements of DIME, as is often done by decision makers at the policy level, we see that the E.U. has predominately used the civilian instruments of power.

⁴ Rosemary Foot, "China and the United States: Between Cold War and Warm Peace," *Survival*, 51:6, 132.

⁵ Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, 2:3, 1957, 202.

⁶ Richard N. Haas, "The Age of Non-Polarity," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008): 3.

⁷ European Force in Chad and the Central African Republic.

This can be explained to some extent by the fact that the E.U. did start life as an explicitly civilian power,⁸ and as such has naturally focused on wielding the civilian instruments. However, this is changing. The current anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden include an E.U. military force commanded from London, Op Atalanta.⁹ Also, the author was a member of the aforementioned E.U. force that went to Chad and Central African Republic in 2008.

Another issue is that there are real challenges in predicting how the E.U. might act, and even if it can act as a block due to its cumbersome decision making structure. Although the E.U.'s collective GDP is greater than that of the U.S.,¹⁰ the E.U. is not represented at G8 or G20 summits, but is represented at the U.N. and NATO. It is this retention of sovereign power or in other words decision making by E.U. member states on economic issues that weakens it and makes it effectively impotent in some arenas. This inconsistency means that where interests are really at stake, member nations of the E.U. represent themselves. This can be seen in E.U. foreign policy where the ambition is to speak with a common voice, even if it is not a single voice.¹¹

As previously mentioned, the E.U. is represented at the political level in the U.N. and NATO, but the western block has only the U.S. and a very limited number of allies willing to take positive military action outside the relatively benign missions cited above. To make matters worse, the lists of some nations' military caveats are embarrassing and surprising at times.

⁸ Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, *The EU: From Civilian Power to Premier League Security Policy Player?*, Forum of Heads of Mission, Helsinki, 27 August 2008, 2.

⁹ E.U. Op Atalanta, www.eunavfor.eu.

¹⁰ International Monetary Fund and CIA World Factbook 2009 list average, EU \$16.3 trillion; U.S. \$14.2 trillion.

¹¹ Rehn, *The EU: Security Player?*, 2.

However, allies who are prepared to act with the other elements of national power should not be discounted, as they can be leveraged as well. The diplomatic legacy of World War II in the form of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council is a prime example. The major powers that are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability, have to follow an interest based policy, and as such can be influenced.

In broad terms, Horowitz and Shalmon identify that the member nations of the E.U. have the following policy: “They advocate focusing on state-based threats and using non-military tools to counter the effects of state weakness.”¹² This means that while use of military force is the last resort when dealing with a failing state, military capabilities should and must, provide conventional deterrence. The U.K. strategic trends programme asserts that military capability should be reserved for wars of necessity rather than for wars of choice, or in other words, for non-discretionary rather than discretionary wars.¹³

The U.S. view has seemed to be somewhat different. Discretionary wars have dominated the world since the Cold War. The aggressive use of the military within a hard power policy to solve international relations issues has proved to be costly. A return to using the full range of instruments of national power has followed the military instrument showing its own limitations as an aspect of hard power. Economic power is significantly limited by interdependence, an issue revisited in Chapter Four.

With this culmination of hard power in the present context, the other types of power have again come to the fore. Soft power has attempted to fill the void, but has suffered

¹² Michael Horowitz and Dan Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” Philadelphia, PA: *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, Elsevier Ltd, Spring 2009, 300.

¹³ U.K. Ministry of Defence, *Future Character of Conflict*, Strategic Trends Programme, Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre. London: February 12, 2010, 7.

from a legacy lack of resources. The utility of soft power in seeking the stabilizing effect of democracy was restated by President George W. Bush in 2005, who said on opening his second term, “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”

This renewed focus on acceptable forms of governance reflects the values held by an international forum, the Commonwealth.¹⁴ This international forum is a predominately democratic, English speaking and substantially stable global presence. The association promotes democracy, rule of law, good governance and human rights. It used to be said that the sun never sets on this unbroken ring around the world, and the U.S. is the only power that fits this description not in the modern association. Any U.S. involvement could be a relationship based on the bedrock of the U.S. led ‘five eyes’ community of AUS, CAN, U.K., U.S. and NZ.

Continued adaptation of the association whilst maintaining these principles, and an inclusive approach, provides an option for like minded countries to cooperate. But, this approach is value based and substantially less interest based than it could be. The forum could also serve member national interests at the same time as promoting its value system.

If we address the U.S. record in looking after national interests, the U.S. has a mixed record. A key aspect of this, identified by Richard Haas, is the lack of U.S. energy policy, which looms large in the changing dynamics of modern hegemony.¹⁵ Barry Posen concludes that the increased import of oil equates to a direct fund transfer to other states

¹⁴ Commonwealth of Nations, formerly the “British Commonwealth,” voluntary association of 54 independent sovereign states.

¹⁵ Haas, “The Age of Non-Polarity,” 4.

for little return. He also identifies that it also brings with it a significant security burden, where losing military control of the sea and the air, the “global commons”, would render U.S. global strategy outmoded in an instant.¹⁶

Deficit reduction is another key driver. The current U.S. economic policy of not dealing with the deficit (current account) has contributed to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere. Economic weakness at home translates into political weakness abroad, with a prime factor identified by Michael Beckley being that the conventional military dominance of Western democracies stems from superior economic development.¹⁷ However, a nation’s standing in the world is about more than statistics, it is also about self-confidence. This makes it clear that it may not be so much about what one has, but about how it is used. The place at the top table is not dictated solely by GDP statistics or military firepower, important though they are.¹⁸

That said, the burden of defense on the U.S. economy is substantially less than it was during most of the cold war, and the advantage it confers to the U.S. compared to other countries is not something to dismiss easily. Michael O’Hanlon suggests that the sheer number of U.S. strategic commitments around the world necessitates a robustly funded Department of Defense (DOD).¹⁹ But, also implied above are the predictive symptoms of overreach, identified by Richard Haas, where the U.S. seems to be trying to deal with

¹⁶ Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, 28:1 (2003), 5-46.

¹⁷ Michael Beckley, “Economic development and Military Effectiveness,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33:1, 43-79, 43.

¹⁸ Unattributed, “Britain’s Assets Exceed its Liabilities,” *Daily Telegraph*, London, 15 November 2010. Online edition <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> (accessed Nov 18, 2010).

¹⁹ Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power: Defense and Security Spending Under Barack Obama* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 28.

every issue, everywhere. These policies do not allow the U.S. to focus on its interests.²⁰

The U.S. experiment in unilateralism could be said to be over.

To continue the robust funding of the DOD is to take a short term view. Those who understand the geopolitical environment know that the U.S. cannot continue on its current spending program. The long term impact of the federal annual budget deficit is too high and continues to exacerbate an already unacceptable federal debt. Michael O'Hanlon offers that the country's deficits and debt are relevant to its economic future and thus its long-term national security,²¹ and as such should be the national security priority.

This reality of a limited budget should be interpreted as meaning that there are hard choices to make about where to spend defense dollars today to ensure that the United States can defeat current threats, while simultaneously ensuring long-term security and prosperity. The real challenge for the military is in analyzing the future context and expected character of conflict, whilst managing drawdown and giving due consideration to the newly developing geo-political place in the world. Resource contests are expected by the military, leading to the conclusion that regardless of policy, interest based decisions will have to be made. Mackinder offered that the reality of a global world where modern methods of communication are so leveling or removing natural barriers, organization by interests constitutes a real threat.²²

Interest based decisions lead to the intractable task of comparing the likely value of investing a marginal dollar in port security relative to fighter aircraft or relative to development or security assistance. Michael O'Hanlon suggests that there are no

²⁰ Haas, "The Age of Non-Polarity," 4.

²¹ O'Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 4.

²² Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 144.

available methods that produce meaningful answers.²³ These security investments primarily contribute to deterrence, either directly or indirectly, and it is this deterrent effect that is so difficult to measure.

When considering deterrence effect, it is also worthwhile to study successful geopolitical positions. The U.S. and in particular the U.K. geo-political positions of the past, present and future remain closely interwoven, as prime actors on the world stage. Other regional partners have their role, but remain at present regionally confined. Thinking strategically about interdependence leads to the conclusion that it is mutual dependence, it cannot be one sided, even if asymmetric. Mackinder suggested that successful leaders who visibly serve the interests of their weaker brethren must be seen as the ideal, in forming lasting, trust-based partnerships.²⁴

Within these partnerships there is also a need to avoid reaching easy consensus and preparing for what is the most comfortable to deal with, and to look to other nations to give examples or insight to deal with a new reality. The National Defense Strategy concludes that better strategic thinking is required if the U.S. is to remain at the forefront of leading a growing community of democracies.²⁵ Success in dealing with them and the issues collectively faced will require the orchestration of national and international power over years and decades to come.²⁶

This orchestration or strategy should not be limited to traditional methods, or those most comfortable to use. Mackinder stated that exact boundaries are not required to

²³ O'Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 5.

²⁴ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 144.

²⁵ NDS 2008, 1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

define a strategic concept,²⁷ and as such any self-imposed limitation, geographical or otherwise on the application of national power can lead to a false sense of security. The global perspective required has taken decades to develop, and still has some way to go to be fully understood as the world has grown in complexity.

As written by Mackinder in 1919 “...there are still vast numbers of our citizens who look out onto a vivid Western foreground, but only to a very dim eastern background.”²⁸ Part of this complexity, as stated by Dr. David Winterford, is that South Asia has a nineteenth century international system, married to twenty-first century weapons. In particular in this region there is a need to deal with the assumption of an ever stronger China. It currently has an export driven economy, Confucian work ethic and almost limitless human resources. However, it is reliant on imported raw materials and semi-finished goods.²⁹

This vulnerability is well recognized by China. It has become increasingly aware of the security implications of its growing economic presence in overseas markets. Jonathon Holsag identifies that the vulnerability of its maritime connections with Africa and the Middle East has attracted attention at all levels of China’s military and political elite.³⁰ China has had to develop an approach to deliver an interest based policy from its burgeoning, but still regionally limited means. China may take note of Mackinder, who accepted Mahan’s description of the preeminence of sea power. But by analogy and

²⁷ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, xx.

²⁸ Ibid., 23.

²⁹ David Winterford, “China,” PACOM Elective at Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, October 6th, 2010.

³⁰ Jonathon Holsag, “Embracing Chinese Security Ambitions,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 32:3, July 2009, 107.

extension, he credited the development of railroads in Eurasia with enabling the ruler of the heartland to challenge that preeminence.³¹

Allison and Zelikow offer that in this context U.S. strategic behavior should seek to influence another actor's choice, in this case China, by working on expectations of how behavior is related to one's own.³² In this behavioral decision making context Schelling clarifies the critical importance of information, on the basis of which to act, and interdependence, the best choice dependent upon the other actor's choice.³³

Alliance vs. Coalition

In taking action, often dependant on other actor's actions, it is important to work to shape or get the partners you need before you need them. There is a need to form alliances rather than rely on loose coalitions that may not share the same long term strategic end states. This should be done by being open, persuasive and understanding. It is this basis of mutual respect that will allow business to be done. The National Defense Strategy identifies strengthening the national burgeoning system of alliances and partnerships as essential to implementing strategy.³⁴ General Eisenhower's assessment is worthy of consideration:

Alliances in the past have often done no more than to name the common foe, and unity of command has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a command of a different nationality or a different service... I was determined, from the first, to do all in my power to make this a truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.³⁵

³¹ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Introduction by Steven V Mladineo.

³² Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999), 41.

³³ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, 1960), 86.

³⁴ NDS 2008, 20.

³⁵ Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (University Press of Mississippi, 1999), 83.

Allison and Zelikow recommend that analysts must reexamine not only trends in international conditions, but also appropriateness of Cold War institutions such as NATO,³⁶ remaining aware of subtle sidebar dialogues. The U.S. cannot afford to become inward looking, but must maintain a healthy appreciation of the world. National policy making in all the major powers cannot become principally preoccupied with affairs at home, there is a balance to be struck.

NATO and the E.U. could be seen as agile institutions that provide a talking shop and the opportunity for political exchange, sometimes on unrelated issues. They are another tool to be used by national leaders. They allow countries to gain and exert influence all the while building influence and credibility. It allows for the creation of relationships that are effective and can be actively utilized, fundamentally getting things done. Engagement must not be an end in itself; it must resolve challenges. This view can be contrary to a correlating view that they are slow and unwieldy. That said, this is primarily a military not diplomatic view.

The accusation leveled at NATO by Richard Haas is that the alliance will lose much of its importance, if only because alliances require predictable threats, outlooks, and obligations.³⁷ This is proving to be false as the alliance faces the new reality and adapts. The success of the Joint, Interagency and Multi-national (JIM) or Comprehensive approach on recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan depends on forums like NATO. As recognized by President Barack Obama, the real challenge is in strengthening old alliances while modernizing them to meet the challenges of a new century.³⁸

³⁶ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 10.

³⁷ Haas, "The Age of Non-Polarity," 4.

³⁸ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, May 2010, President Barack Obama, covering letter.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) says however, that more selective relationships may provide more return on investment. There must be balance between the clear need for partners and mission requirements for effectiveness and efficiency,³⁹ and not to be limited to the relationships of the past.⁴⁰

The NDS also states:

We must balance strategic risk across our responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government and among our international partners. To succeed, we must harness and integrate all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends and partners. We cannot prevail if we act alone.⁴¹

This is particularly true as allies often possess capabilities, skills, or knowledge that the U.S. cannot duplicate. Michael O'Hanlon asserts that to focus on the remote possibility of a conventional conflict would not be a successful means of holding together key alliances with a forward looking agenda.⁴²

The NDS adds that in strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships, securing U.S. access and retaining freedom of action,⁴³ detail will vary according to mutual interests. These unifying relationships should be built on respect, reciprocity, and transparency.⁴⁴

When integrating and unifying efforts, rationalization, that is any action that increases the effectiveness of allied and/or coalition forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance, is important. Joint doctrine suggests that standardization, a four level process beginning with efforts for

³⁹ NDS 2008, 21.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 15.

⁴¹ Ibid., 1.

⁴² O'Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 16.

⁴³ NDS 2008, 13.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 15.

compatibility, continuing with interoperability and interchangeability measures, and culminating with commonality, is not an end in itself. This commonality is important but interdependence comes only from the combination of rationalization and standardization.⁴⁵

An example of this is the burgeoning U.K. and French defense cooperation, with the French defense minister saying that “French fighter jets could be stationed on Britain’s new aircraft carrier as the two nations’ navies become ‘interdependent’.”⁴⁶ It seems prudent that the U.S. addresses these foreign bilateral agreements, and where possible contributes to retain influence in their employment.

Once a level of interdependence is reached there remains the challenge of mobilizing collective action, and dealing with the shortfalls of the international system. President Barack Obama understood that America has not succeeded by stepping outside the currents of the international system.⁴⁷ Allison and Zelikow concluded that, “The key is not how many enemies the United States kills, but how many allies it grows.”⁴⁸

Working with allies and partners, along with better integration with civilian entities,⁴⁹ was brought into fresh focus in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review in order to prevent and deter conflict. It recognized the CSIS Smart Power commission assertion

⁴⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 Mar 2007), 21.

⁴⁶ James Kirkup, “French Fighter Jets Could Land on British carriers,” *Daily Telegraph*, London, 29 Oct 2010. Online edition <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> (accessed Nov 1, 2010).

⁴⁷ NSS 2010, President Barack Obama, covering letter.

⁴⁸ Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 10.

⁴⁹ QDR 2010, Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, covering letter.

that “The United States must genuinely institutionalize the value of winning allies to its side in order to achieve its objectives abroad.”⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 13.

CHAPTER 3: POWER

Within the reality described from the viewpoint of the previous chapter, and cognizant of the fact that power may evaporate when the context changes,¹ power is discussed in this chapter as hard, soft and smart power, as articulated by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.. As he said, when power is defined as synonymous with the resources that produce it, the paradox is sometimes encountered that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want.² However, Michael O'Hanlon rightly points out that economically weak countries cannot remain great powers.³ The CSIS commission on Smart Power concluded:

... America can learn a lesson from certain elements of Great Britain's strategy in the nineteenth century, when it was the world's foremost power. Great Britain took the lead in maintaining the balance of power in Europe, promoting an international economic system and maintaining freedom of the seas. It benefited doubly from this – from the goods themselves and from the way they legitimized British power in the eyes of others.⁴

It is this concept of what realized power is that is not only complex but value-loaded, a fact that may help explain the firmness of the convictions many people have about what power 'really' is.⁵ Nye says that it is also important to recognize that converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership,⁶ ultimately captured as the concept of 'Smart Power'.

¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power* (New York: Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group, 2004), 2.

² Ibid., 3.

³ O'Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 144.

⁴ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 12.

⁵ Kjell Goldman and Gunnar Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems in the Study of International Influence* (London: SAGE Publications, 1979), 2.

⁶ Nye, *Soft Power*, 3.

Within this context there are various traditions of applying power. Jack Snyder identifies that while realists dwell on the balance of power and liberals on the power of international trade and democracy, constructivists believe that debates about ideas are the fundamental building blocks of international life.⁷ Within these traditions there are extreme views that promote one or another instrument of power, but a balanced view would utilize each in appropriate measure. Clearly an effective approach would be to use the insights of each of these three theoretical traditions as a check on the irrational exuberance of others.⁸

One of these insights, as identified by Mackinder, may be the assertion that a realist focuses on ways and means, rather than elusive ends,⁹ which can lead to the interpretation of activity as a series of tactical actions, not focusing on a longer term objective or end-state. However, the intent of the realist remains essentially strategic, with the aforementioned caveat, whereas that of a true democrat is ethical.¹⁰ This may explain to some extent the change of direction of U.S. foreign policy, in terms of the utility of hard or soft power, dependant on which tradition is in power.

One common theme across traditions is the desire for freedom of action. As stated in the National Defense Strategy the United States requires freedom of action in the global commons and strategic access to important regions of the world to meet national security needs.¹¹ This view is reliant on the U.S. status as a superpower where the term was defined in 1979 as ‘great power plus great mobility of power’.¹² Although this term is

⁷ Jack Snyder, “One World – Rival Themes,” *Foreign Policy, Issue 145* [Nov/Dec 2004]: 60.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁹ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 11.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹¹ NDS 2008, 16.

¹² Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 64.

seen as dated, the definition stated here still applies to the U.S. A further research question may be; what does mobility of power mean today?

In this context, considering the writings of Mahan who wrote for a specific capability in a specific domain, the strategic impact of the military in the maritime global common was primarily economic. It also allowed for what could be called interior lines in conflict, this concept a direct read across from Napoleon.

Mahan's Sea Power Principles are as follows: (1) Command of the sea through naval superiority; (2) that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produce national 'wealth and greatness.'¹³

Mackinder does however warn against over reliance on one domain: "So impressive have been the results of British sea-power that there has perhaps been a tendency to neglect the warnings of history and to regard sea power in general as inevitably having, because of the unity of the ocean, the last word in the rivalry with land power."¹⁴ If we apply this in the modern era, where the air and cyber domains have been added to the global commons, there is risk in too much focus on one to the detriment of others. Philip Crowl warns that lessons should only be learnt from the past in the form of fundamental principles.¹⁵

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that due to the added complexity of multiple domains, dealing with challenges requires better and more diverse capabilities in both hard and soft power, and greater flexibility and skill in employing them.¹⁶

¹³ Philip A Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" In *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Edited by Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1986, 451.

¹⁴ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 43.

¹⁵ Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan," 449.

¹⁶ NDS 2008, 4.

Hard Power

Michael O'Hanlon defines Hard Power as political power obtained from the use of military and/or economic coercion to influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies. It consists of the broader set of instruments with direct and near-term bearing on national security, including ongoing military operations and the stability and security of crucial countries around the world.¹⁷

Since 9/11 there has been a perception held by some that international norms and institutions constrain American behavior making the world less safe for Americans. A period of using hard power as the first choice was seen with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The CSIS commission on Smart Power concluded that the end of this period of growing reliance on U.S. hard power has come with administration change, which introduced a new perception of what approach to take.¹⁸

America's future is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire. Instead we will work through a community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering. Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate 'soft power' to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among disenfranchised populations in the world.¹⁹

The NDS published in 2008 concludes that the period of reliance on hard power has demonstrated that high-end conventional operations are likely to draw on fewer partners with the capacity, will, and capability to act in support of mutual goals in the near term.²⁰

¹⁷ O'Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 4.

¹⁸ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 13.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), foreword.

²⁰ NDS 2008, 15.

It also identifies that there is thus a need to work with longstanding friends and allies to transform their capabilities, and where appropriate, to transfer defense articles to build partner capacity.²¹ As an analogy, returning to Mahan's naval assertions, it is the maximum offensive power of the fleet, and not the maximum power of a single ship, that is the object of battleship construction.²² The maximum offensive and psychological power of any modern fleet primarily lies in the carrier it escorts, but not exclusively. Escorts have significant capability today. However, major surface units are still required in naval warfare, and this can be used as an analogy for the requirement for lead countries in the international order, whilst capable escorts can be an analogy for strong and willing junior partners.

The requirement for lead countries in the international order does not reduce the need for bilateral relations, or for that matter hard power. The relationship between two countries is shaped by many complex factors, but as Ying Fan, an assistant professor of economics at the University of Michigan, says it is ultimately decided by geopolitics and strategic interests, in which soft power may play only a limited role.²³

Soft Power

Joseph Nye defined Soft Power as the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction. It is the opposite of hard power. If a state can set the agenda for others or shape their preferences, it can save a lot on carrots and sticks. However, it rarely can totally replace either,²⁴ as it relies on the power of suggestion.

²¹ Ibid., 15.

²² Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan," 458.

²³ Ying Fan, "Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion," *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, Houndmills, May 2008, Vol 4, Iss 2., 148.

²⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, 5.

Looking at domestic politics, Mackinder observed that it is possible to see that most people today are open to ‘suggestion’, a fact well known to an election observer, with politicians rarely stopping to reason with their audiences.²⁵ If we extrapolate this to the international domain, the CSIS Commission on Smart Power concluded that one of the biggest sources of soft power is quite simply the suggestive and very real power of America’s success as a nation.²⁶

Using this very success in the indirect way of gaining support through co-operation rather than coercing is fundamental to the nature of soft power. Nye tells us; “If behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction – soft power is at work.”²⁷ This attraction can have a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action. This influence can be very useful when dealing with the public opinion of a democracy, where power is dispersed.²⁸

Influence based on power over opinion was captured by the British realist E.H. Carr. Before World War II Carr defined the elements of international power as military, economic and power over opinion.²⁹ In this definition the only element of power that could be ‘soft’ is power over opinion and that requires legitimacy. Legitimacy is central to soft power, as Michael Ignatieff said in relation to Canada and its relation to the United States, “...we have something they want. They need legitimacy.”³⁰ Nye offers that

²⁵ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 132.

²⁶ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 7.

²⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*, 7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁹ E.H.Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 108.

³⁰ Michael Ignatieff, “Canada in the Age of Terror: Multilateralism Meets a Moment of Truth,” *Options Politiques*, February 2003, 16.

typically when countries make their power legitimate to others they encounter less resistance to their wishes.³¹

Institutions can enhance and legitimize a country's soft power, for example Britain in the 19th century with the gold standard and free trade, and the United States in the latter half of the 20th century with the IMF, WTO and UN. Armitage and Nye suggest that multilateral consultation in institutions remains a more effective means of generating soft power and legitimacy than unilateral assertions of values,³² the institutions deliver more than their primary purpose, they allow consultation on a broad range of issues, sometimes in the margins.

Activity in these institutions can be affected by domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, or indifferent to the opinion of others. In this case Nye offers: "If they are based on a narrow approach to national interests, they can undermine soft power."³³

It is the lack of authenticity between values and interests that can affect legitimacy. The value agenda has the support of pacifists, who as identified by Mackinder, are inconsistent in that today they so often urge intervention in the affairs of other nations,³⁴ affecting legitimacy of such action. However, as Nye says, the use of force can require an elaborate moral justification to ensure popular support, unless actual survival is at stake,³⁵ providing mitigation for this issue. There is clearly a changing role for military power, with the absence of a prevailing warrior ethic in modern democracies.

³¹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 10.

³² Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 13.

³³ Nye, *Soft Power*, 14.

³⁴ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 17.

³⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*, 18.

Considering this changing role of the military, we also need to address the fact that popularity is not an end in itself in foreign policy. However, a well run, highly competent military with strong values can be attractive to others, and be something they aspire to or wish to be associated with. Shared values already dominate the ‘islands of peace’, such as Europe, where Nye says the use of force is no longer an option in relations among states: this could indicate the growing importance of soft power.³⁶ However, the unacceptability of the use of force may have more to do with deterrence.

Deterrence may have indirect effects where the consequence may be displaced in time or space, causing them to be significantly harder to identify and link with the original action of deterrence. This is amplified by the fact that deterrence acts to change behavior, and how is that change attributed or even observed at what could be some distance, geographically or from a different perspective.³⁷

Nye in thinking about the role of soft power stated a need to remember the role of institutions and allies and develop a better balance of hard and soft power in foreign policy.³⁸ The effectiveness of the main elements of soft power of culture, political values, and foreign policies always depend on the context.³⁹

Smart Power

The CSIS Commission on Smart Power defined the ability to combine both hard and soft power into a viable strategy or to achieve balance in their application as ‘Smart Power’, an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests

³⁶ Ibid., 20.

³⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, Change 2 (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 Mar 2010), IV-10.

³⁸ Nye, *Soft Power*, 147.

³⁹ Ibid., 12.

heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand influence and establish the legitimacy of action.⁴⁰

U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has a “smart power whole of government” theme in the 2010 QDDR, including providing key domestic agencies the capability and authority to deploy, partially answering the prerequisite asserted by Armitage and Nye in 2007 that “The U.S. government must develop the means to grow its soft power and harness the dynamism found within civil society and the private sector.”⁴¹

It is this dynamism that is needed to see opportunities. Mackinder identified that some fundamental and permanent opportunities of a nation are due to its geographic position. Rather than seeing conventional boundaries these ‘ways and means’ of permanent physical opportunities deserve attention,⁴² particularly in the ‘near-abroad’ civil society and private sector shared interests with Canada and Mexico.

A second permanent opportunity is that of the global commons. It may help to consider T.E. Lawrence’s concept to address this. He offers, in comparable context, “...suppose we were an influence (as we might be), an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas?”⁴³ This may be of some use if applied to the global commons. It seems reasonable that Secretary Clinton would agree.

Using a maritime example in 1986, Philip Crowl offered the following assessment: “In Mahan’s view, also, navies were better instruments of national policy than armies. Less blunt, less symbolic of aggressive intent, more mobile and therefore more responsive to political direction, the influence of a navy could be felt where the

⁴⁰ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 7.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴² Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 15.

⁴³ T.E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, Tavistock, Devon UK (October 1920): 5.

national armies cannot go.”⁴⁴ If the future instruments of power could have the qualities that Mahan ascribes to the navy, influence could be felt where other instruments could not go.

The reality of a complex, interdependent world demands such thought. Experts in such matters find that increasing economic interdependence has not reduced the power resources of many states, but these and non-economic interdependencies might have diminished their willingness to use them.⁴⁵

The determination of willingness to use power is a vital factor. Understanding the decision making of states can provide insight to determine willingness. If national governments are treated as if they were centrally coordinated, purposive individuals, it helps us understand policy choices and actions. Allison and Zelikow asserted that this reduction, like any simplification, hides issues as well as provides insight.⁴⁶

In terms of direction, one could marry idealism to reality to achieve balance between hard and soft power. Looking to Mackinder the issue then becomes that modern idealism is based on self-realization and equality of opportunity, where previously it had been based on self-denial,⁴⁷ and the collective good. But, Armitage and Nye identify that by complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in soft power, America can build the framework it needs to tackle tough global challenges.⁴⁸

If we redefine power as more than the simple imposition of will, but the flexible and adaptive application of capabilities across a continuum from hard to soft, we can see that this depends upon national authenticity and respect. An increase of soft power resourcing

⁴⁴ Cowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 462.

⁴⁵ Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 186.

⁴⁶ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 3.

⁴⁷ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 7.

⁴⁸ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 5.

would contribute to the credibility and balance required to wield it, likely introducing significant efficiencies. That said, Milan Vego says that a sound and coherent strategy cannot, in and of itself, secure victory in war.⁴⁹

With this thought lies the question, what type of power is next? This requires a study of the instruments of power and the military role among them.

⁴⁹ Milan Vego, *Part I: Fundamentals, Joint Operational Warfare* (Washington D.C.: United States Naval War College, Joint military Operations Department, Sept 20th 2007), I-44.

CHAPTER 4: INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

The acronym DIME (Diplomatic; Information; Military; and Economic) describes the elements or instruments of power¹ whose objectives are developed at the national and regional, theater or country strategic levels. More usefully, however, they are used to define the broader unified action challenges of the interdependent friendly team.² These elements of power were first recorded by Thucydides, a Greek historian and author of the “History of the Peloponnesian War”.³

These unified actions, when defined within a sound and coherent strategy, are required to orchestrate the accomplishment of strategic objectives through the use of military and non-military sources of power. National decision making and interagency coordination should forge the vital link between the military and the other primary instruments (diplomatic, informational, and economic) of national power.⁴

Armitage and Nye say that this reliance on national decision making and the reality of relatively low level coordination, both typically in crisis settings, does not allow long-range planning. The Washington D.C. agency and department institutional cultures can be seen as stove piped and inhibitors to longer term joint action;⁵ the requirement for a national strategic planning capability has never been greater.

The 2010 QDDR “Leading Through Civilian Power” goes some way in attempting to address this issue, although some say it is the militarization of foreign policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in his January 2011 guidance does however positively

¹ Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command, “Commanders Critical Information Requirements at the operational level,” 26 June 2007, 1, <http://jko.jfcom.mil> (accessed Feb 10, 2011).

² Ibid., 3-4.

³ Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Rex Warner. (Baltimore, MD: Penguin), 1954.

⁴ Joint Publication 1, xx.

⁵ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 9.

complement the QDDR with a restating of civilian primacy, marking a turning point in recent history where the military has been a key driver in U.S. activity around the world.

That said, the reality which cannot be overlooked is that the Pentagon is the best trained and best resourced arm of the federal government. As a result, Armitage and Nye identified that it tends to fill every void, even those that civilian instruments should fill.⁶ The relative merit of each instrument of power must be in balance, rather than having one dominant instrument.

Michael O'Hanlon states that within this quest for balance there is a need for the United States to fund and apply all its tools of foreign policy and national security in more appropriate measure.⁷ Armitage and Nye suggest that the impediment to this is that there is not a budget based on a strategy that specifies trade-offs among instruments.⁸ Milan Vego offers that strategic guidance, when properly written, should also specify which military and non-military sources of power are or will become available, and constraints and restraints on their use.⁹ The National Security Strategy captures elements of this, indirectly recommending further funding of the other instruments:

We must also build and integrate the capabilities that can achieve our interests, and the interests we share with other countries and peoples. Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends on diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries.¹⁰

⁶ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 7.

⁷ O'Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 144.

⁸ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 10.

⁹ Vego, *Part I: Fundamentals, Joint Operational Warfare*, I-45.

¹⁰ NSS 2010, President Barack Obama, covering letter.

If we look abroad we can see that the realization that all the instruments of power are in need of coordination is not solely a western phenomenon. Arguably no statesman ever adjusted war to policy with a nicer judgment than Bismarck. Mackinder identified that he had an insight into the minds of other nations than his own, with his method primarily psychological,¹¹ something that can now be seen in China.

We can see that in the modern Chinese approach where there is the recognition that China should integrate various means: political, economic, intelligence and military in response to security threats to China's foreign interests.¹² Their behavior can be described as rational, where rationality as defined by Allison and Zelikow, refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints.¹³ This assumption of rational behavior – not just of intelligent behavior, but of behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system,¹⁴ is something Schelling found noteworthy, possibly a signpost.

To establish the future importance of the military compared to the other instruments of power, all must be considered in turn.

Diplomatic

If we take this rational model and look at diplomacy we can see that there is a direct and immediate role of diplomacy in promoting U.S. national security. However, there is now a larger menu of global issues, more countries and multilateral organizations to work

¹¹ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 13.

¹² “Youxiao Yingdui Gezhong Chuantong he Fei Chuantong Anquan Weixie,” (How to deal effectively with traditional and non-traditional threats), *Xinhua*, December 13, 2006. (In Chinese). Jonathon Holsag, “Embracing Chinese Security Ambitions,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 32:3 (July 2009): 109.

¹³ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 18.

¹⁴ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 4.

with, and this as Michael O’Hanlon identifies leaves numerous unmet needs.¹⁵ Allocated budgetary resources do not reflect this reality.

Considering this fact and that diplomacy is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives,¹⁶ it is interesting to note that Nye found Britain and France each spend about the same as the U.S. on public diplomacy.¹⁷ In broader terms internationally, diplomacy and foreign assistance are often underfunded and underused. Armitage and Nye concluded that these tools are neglected in part because of the difficulty of demonstrating their short term impact on critical challenges.¹⁸

Nye identifies three main elements to public diplomacy: (1) Daily communications explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions. (2) Strategic communication where a set of simple themes is developed. (3) Development of lasting relationships with key individuals.¹⁹ These three elements require in depth subject knowledge, and continual awareness of strategic and domestic context, which are skills learnt over time. Kagan offers that it is this experience as practitioners in the formation and execution of American foreign policy and keen understanding of international relations that are invaluable.²⁰

Putting this experience into practice, results are hard to measure, because as a diplomat will say, there is no beginning or end to diplomacy. It cannot be treated as a military campaign, where there is often a clear start and end state. Diplomacy and the

¹⁵ O’Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 134.

¹⁶ Joint Publication 1, I-9.

¹⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*, 77.

¹⁸ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 8,9.

¹⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 109.

²⁰ Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*, (New York: Anchor Books, Random House, 1996), xiii.

military can work hand in hand to achieve a long term aim, with the military in the supporting role when conducting defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).²¹ As an example, Michael O’Hanlon observed that the American policy of engagement combined with deterrence in S.E. Asia focused on China had seemed to be working,²² although now there are signs of China flexing its muscles.

Regardless, in this context, the catastrophe threatened by modern state on state war makes this type of confrontation less likely. However, Kagan suggests that a better understanding of the origins of war is important so that informed policies can be pursued in an attempt to prevent it.²³ Diplomacy also requires the diplomat to see issues from another’s perspective. Prior to 1945 the observing and reporting of other national views was the only task assigned to embassies, there were no programs to administer. With multiple international programs now to administer, the embassies are now busier than ever. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has stated: “It has become clear that America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long.”²⁴ It is in this light that diplomats have framed policies in the 2010 QDDR. Armitage and Nye recognized that policies based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of national interest are easier to make attractive to people overseas than policies that take a narrower perspective.²⁵ Diplomacy is once again being given the mandate to apply its skill set.

²¹ Joint Publication 1, I-9.

²² O’Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 6.

²³ Kagan, *On the Origins of War*, 5.

²⁴ Speech of Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates at the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2008.

²⁵ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 13.

Information

As part of the skill set, all instruments of national power need to seek first to understand then to be understood, as it provides the best chance of getting synergies and creating a ‘win, win’ situation. Interdependence is all about synergies, you can achieve a public victory if all sides arrive at one conclusion. To attempt to achieve public victory, a tool is Public Diplomacy which is described as ‘waging peace’,²⁶ and is a complex subject. If over simplified it can harm an agenda, as British expert Mark Leonard put it “...skeptics who treat the term ‘public diplomacy’ as a mere euphemism for propaganda miss the point. Simple propaganda often lacks credibility and thus is counterproductive as public diplomacy.”²⁷

Other aspects of the international scene are culture and ideology. They couple together in shaping the international rules based system consistent with interests and values. This can channel and limit the activities of others, and with this efficiency can come increased influence. Experts offer that these channels provide the means to exercise power through the conveyance of a message using some kind of signal, often a combination of verbal statements and non-verbal acts.²⁸ They must be both perceived and credible as they deal with psychological factors.

Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history. Yet political leaders have spent little time thinking about how the nature of power has changed and, more specifically, about how to incorporate the soft dimensions into their strategies for wielding power.²⁹

²⁶ Joint Advanced Warfighting School, *Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 10-11* (Norfolk VA: Joint Forces Staff College), Ch II, 5.

²⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*, 107.

²⁸ Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 66.

²⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 1.

Sending messages using this broader informational instrument of national power is difficult as it has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single center of control. The United States believes in the free market place of ideas.³⁰ However, Mackinder advises that knowledge is not only pursued mainly for its own sake, but as a means to an end, with that end being the success of the state.³¹ In the information age, Nye commends that ‘cooperative’ advantages are increasingly important, and an improved ability to cooperate with friends or allies may produce advantages against rivals.³²

In order to coordinate these efforts, the U.S government uses strategic communication to provide top-down guidance on using the informational instrument of power in specific situations.³³ But the National Defense Strategy only mentions military, diplomatic, and economic means.³⁴ It is difficult not to notice that information is absent from this list, virtual presence is actual absence. Armitage and Nye say that militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas.³⁵ But another truth identified by Mackinder is that those who are allowed opportunities of testing their ideas become responsible thinkers.³⁶ This is captured in the Chinese military strategy of “informatization”³⁷, where they plan to win local wars using all the elements of DIME, using an active defense with a solid offensive component:

The Chinese are the ultimate heirs of B.H. Liddell Hart and his indirect approach: They would have difficulty conquering Taiwan militarily, but

³⁰ Joint Publication 1, I-9.

³¹ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 14.

³² Nye, *Soft Power*, 20.

³³ Joint Publication 1, I-9.

³⁴ NDS 2008, 6.

³⁵ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 6.

³⁶ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 133.

³⁷ Annual report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the Peoples Republic of China, U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, 22.

believe they could push us into an asymmetrical defeat through economic, diplomatic, and media campaigns in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Latin America – while crippling the lifestyle of America’s citizens. Instead we obsess about the fate of a pair of aircraft carriers. For that matter, how about a scenario that realistically portrayed the global media as siding overwhelmingly with China? The metastasizing power of the media is a true strategic revolution of our time – one to which our narrow revolution in military affairs has no reply.³⁸

The view captured above shows the intent of the Chinese to use all the elements of power at their disposal. This is in the Sun Tzu “Warring States” tradition, to defeat the enemy without fighting physically³⁹ - Sun Tzu is widely read in the Chinese military. Information deterrence is a concept that flows from these arguments, and is a concept recognized in China as potentially being a revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics.⁴⁰

Continuing with this idea of information deterrence, the concept of an ‘information umbrella’ is an extension of the concept of a nuclear weapons umbrella. This concept asserts that in the information age, information superiority has a similar deterrent role, dependant on the information being the truth. This may actually be used in peacetime to gain the initiative by making a huge strike on the opponent at an extremely small price, and thus achieve objectives. Zhou Fangyin says this strike would focus on the will of the enemy, with the principal form of combat seen as cyber viruses and hackers.⁴¹

Obviously there is a risk that the U.S. may suffer such a strike. The chaos and complexity that such a strike would induce require a cognitive filter, when considering the context, as identifying the change is the key factor. In predicting or dealing with a

³⁸ Ralph Peters, “The Counter-revolution in Military Affairs: Fashionable Thinking about Defense Technology ignores the Great Threats of our time,” *The Weekly Standard*, February 6th, 2006, 22.

³⁹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, 77.

⁴⁰ Jacqueline Newmyer, “The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33:4, August 2010, 483.

⁴¹ Zhou Fangyin, “The Effect of the Information revolution on Military Affairs and Security,” CPP20010817000186, Beijing, August 1st, 2001, 28-32.

strike, the direct or indirect effect or evidence and its relevance are important.

Environmental scanning to find the signs of change can enhance decision making in this case. This coupled with the formation of a structured argument, where supporting questions aid the answering of the main question is a key premise in information exploitation. Whoever is most responsive to change survives, not the strongest or cleverest.

It is however easy to miss what you are not looking for, this requires a proactive rather than reactive approach. Dai Quigmen suggests that the measure of success of this form of warfare is not measured in the number of casualties or territory gained, but whether the enemy has submitted to the perpetrators will.⁴² This is captured nicely by Lynn Montrose when referring to the Greek and Roman empires; “Of the three divisions of attack, however, the moral continued to prevail more often than the physical or economic”.⁴³ Information is the fundamental instrument that affects the moral component, and must be considered in assessing the balance of power, and primacy of instruments in wielding power.

Previously, in looking at changes in balance of power, we have not considered a fact stated by Richard Haas: “The proliferation of information is as much a cause of non-polarity as is the proliferation of weaponry.”⁴⁴ The role of the newly established U.S. CYBERCOM with both offensive and defensive capabilities is central. In U.K. campaign planning, information is not considered a separate instrument of power, but one that shrouds the other three. This focus on the information element as all pervading helps in

⁴² Dai Quigmen, “Discourse on Armed Forces Informanization Building and Information Warfare Building,” in Shen Weignang (ed.), *On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs*, Beijing and New China Press, 2004, 39-47.

⁴³ Lynn Montross, “War Through the Ages,” New York: Harper and Row, 1960, 161.

⁴⁴ Richard N. Haas, “The Age of Non-Polarity,” *Foreign Affairs* 87 no. 3 (May/Jun 2008): 3.

developing and defining ideas, and insights that can contribute to an answer, the merit of an idea being if it is proven in fact.

Military

The military is often used to convey an idea or a threat primarily for deterrence. U.S. defense spending is currently balanced between being focused on winning wars and deterring and preparing for future conflicts,⁴⁵ where experts define deterrence as based on a threat of violence contingent on certain undesired behavior by the opponent,⁴⁶ or in other words the drawing of a red line. Nye offers that governments use military power to issue these threats, fight, and, with a combination of skill and chance, achieve desired outcomes within a reasonable time.⁴⁷ Everett Dolman clarifies this, stating that it is the traditional purpose, or role, of the military to provide an option for the political decision-maker to achieve the political ends of the state.⁴⁸

However, there are problems with the military role in wielding soft power, which arise when it tries to apply wartime tactics in ambiguous situations. Nye argues that this is particularly prevalent in the current ill-defined war on terrorism, which has further blurred the distinction between normal civilian activities and war.⁴⁹ This has led to the redefinition of tactics over recent campaigns.

In this context what must be dealt with are the reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is that to become the model to which to work, or should a strategy have a wider field of regard, and more 'ways' available? One might ask an age old question, in

⁴⁵ O'Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 5.

⁴⁶ Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 70.

⁴⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*, 99.

⁴⁸ Everett C. Dolman, "U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space," *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XXVI, no.1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 166.

⁴⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 117.

this case phrased by Mackinder in 1919: “What degree of international reconstruction is necessary if the world is long to remain a safe place for democracies?”⁵⁰ Taking this at face value, it could be said that in general, the more non-military aspects of the strategic objective pre-dominate, the less need there is for military power. However Milan Vego asserts that the reduced need does not make it less complex to use military force to accomplish the given strategic or operational objective.⁵¹

What the military must provide is options. A key question by a Naval War College paper is, “Can the proposed Force Structure provide high value across a range of plausible scenarios?”⁵² Are core capabilities required or not? In response to this it can be seen that sub-optimization is endemic, with more creative ways of fighting dismissed due to organizational dynamics. Hedging is often the solution, done by providing a balanced force with capabilities across the spectrum. However, hedging can be very costly and must be coupled with other strategic options to buy time and a tactical concept on how to use them.

Nye turns to history to gain insight and see if hedging is the solution. He saw that before the fall of France in 1940, Britain and France had more tanks than Germany, but that advantage in military power resources did not accurately predict the outcome of the battle,⁵³ proving that, as Charles Ardant du Picq said, the instruments of battle are

⁵⁰ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 6.

⁵¹ Vego, *Part I: Fundamentals, Joint Operational Warfare*, I-46.

⁵² Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, *The Art of Strategy and Force Planning*, Strategy and Force Planning, 4th ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004), 26.

⁵³ Nye, *Soft Power*, 6.

valuable only if one knows how to use them.⁵⁴ It is the ability to buy time and apply the military instrument within a sound strategy that is important.

The following quote by Shelton who was CJCS in early 2001 captures the dilemma; “The really hard decisions were about the use of military force – under what strategy and plan, what types of force, when, how much, against what enemies or threats. The decision to go to war defined a nation, not just to the world but to the nation itself.”⁵⁵ If we look to history we can see the broad theme repeated in WWI:

The Allies have won the war. But how have we won? The process is full of warning. We were saved, in the first place, by the readiness of the British Fleet, and by the decision which sent it to sea: so British communications with France were secured. That readiness and decision were the outcome of the British habit of looking to the one thing essential in the midst of many things we leave slipshod; it is the way of the capable amateur... We were saved, in short, by exceptional genius and exceptional heroism from the results of an average refusal to foresee and prepare; eloquent testimony both to the strength and the weakness of democracy.⁵⁶

This focus on the military instrument is an insurance policy, and what has been recognized in the National Defense Strategy is that the spectrum of warfare has become even more complex, with modes of warfare appearing individually or in combination, spanning and intertwining hard and soft power.⁵⁷

Economic

This increased span and intertwining of power has affected the classical image of the international system as one of military hierarchy of states. Experts say that military capability used to be decisive in the predominance of issues, but nowadays, in a rules-

⁵⁴ Charles Ardant du Picq 1821-1870, *Battle Studies Ancient and Modern Battle*, Translated from the 8th edition in French by John N. Greely, 1921. Online edition <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/7294/pg7294.html> (accessed Feb 10, 2011).

⁵⁵ Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 70.

⁵⁶ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 105.

⁵⁷ NDS 2008, 4.

based multilateral international system, economic structures determine the distribution of power.⁵⁸

However, on interstate military issues, the United States is indeed the only superpower. It also has global military reach, and so it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of uni-polarity and hegemony. But even then, Nye identifies that in a global economy even the United States must consider how the use of force might jeopardize its economic objectives,⁵⁹ as on interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is multi-polar.⁶⁰ Ideally, if the U.S. is to be fraternal towards other nations, it must be independent in an economic as in every other sense; Mackinder identifies that a nation must have and keep a complete and balanced life.⁶¹ It is this freedom of action to wield the economic instrument that depends on the growth, scale and resilience of the U.S. economy.

The U.S. government financial management ways and means support the economic instrument of national power. The Department of the Treasury, as steward of U.S. economic and financial systems, is an influential participant in the international economy, working with other nations and institutions to encourage economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crises.⁶²

This interaction with the international economic situation must inform U.S. national security policymaking, but Michael O'Hanlon says it should not dominate it or predetermine its conclusions,⁶³ as national interests are gained through power. Kagan offers that combining confidence in the pacifying power of commerce with the conviction

⁵⁸ Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 1.

⁵⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 20.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁶¹ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 137.

⁶² Joint Publication 1, I-10.

⁶³ O'Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 11.

that the growth of democracy will stabilize the world, means that interest based policies become justifiable and necessary.⁶⁴ National security greatly benefits in the longer term when power is maintained through interest based economic policies.

A paper by Professor Steven Metz at the U.S. Army War College asserts that economic interdependence, as we know it today,⁶⁵ demands this interest based approach. It is no longer a choice, and likely never was. European experts have said that international economic interdependence results from relatively free foreign commerce,⁶⁶ and does not depend on the volume of international trade and finance. It depends on the emergence of particular patterns of asymmetrical dependencies that supply a basis for the wielding of economic power.⁶⁷

This interdependence makes it ever more difficult to define national interests, and they are often not defined until a crisis occurs. Fred Sadrak says that the identification of these interests is often further complicated by the inter-relationship between domestic public interests, party politics, and special interest group agendas with true national interests.⁶⁸ Not only is it difficult to define the interests, but it is hard to make decisions. As Lindbeck commented in 1975 “The economic systems of the world have during recent decades increasingly expanded over the borders of national states, at the same time as the political systems have continued to be mainly national in character...[This]...tends to make the national states less and less effective decision-making units.”⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Kagan, *On the Origins of War*, 2.

⁶⁵ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Land Power*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003), 9-11.

⁶⁶ Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 171.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 185.

⁶⁸ Fred Sadrak, *Aid to formulating a Regional Strategic Appraisal*, U.S. Army War College, 2001, 1. http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/rsa_aid2001.htm (accessed Feb 9, 2011)

⁶⁹ Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 194.

Trying to make decisions on how to wield the economic instrument of power can also depend on the time available. Nye states that economic power can freeze foreign bank accounts overnight, and can distribute bribes or aid promptly, but economic sanctions can often take a long time, if ever to produce outcomes.⁷⁰ Experts agree that this is primarily due to the fact that they are very difficult to enforce because there are usually no neutrals in economic confrontations.⁷¹

However, in low level attempts at international coercion, the economic instrument can be more successful. There have been such frequent attempts in certain relationships, that it can become routine. Experts primarily see this in the relationship between the donor and recipient of economic aid, where the aid comes with strings attached,⁷² for example present day Pakistan. This is countered by others who offer aid with no strings attached, particularly with relation to human rights and Chinese aid in Africa.

As captured in joint doctrine, the U.S. government more often has outwardly a more open view. It facilitates the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services worldwide. It sees a strong U.S. economy with free access to global markets and resources as a fundamental engine of general welfare, the enabler of a strong national defense, and an influencing factor for economic expansion by U.S. trade partners worldwide.⁷³

British Prime Minister David Cameron has recently articulated a ‘Commercial Foreign Policy’, “We have the resources – commercial, military and cultural – to remain

⁷⁰ Nye, *Soft Power*, 99.

⁷¹ Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 170.

⁷² Ibid., 184.

⁷³ Joint Publication 1, I-10.

a major player in the world.”⁷⁴ This is a return to the policies of the Britain of old, the nineteenth century maritime trading hegemon. One key capability was control of maritime commerce through command of the sea. Mahan saw this as the primary function of navies,⁷⁵ and shows a peculiarly naval dominance of the military contribution to the economic element of power in that century. Trade figures show the vast majority of global trade still uses the sea, one of the global commons.

If we use an example of disruption to another global common, that of air, we can see what happens if there is loss of freedom of use. The example of the volcanic ash cloud that stopped all air traffic over Europe in March 2010 shows the consequences of loss of air travel and freight. However, the consequences affected airlines, individuals and niche business rather than trade in general. If we were to hypothesize a similar access denying event in the maritime domain over a slightly longer period, it would likely have proportionately greater effect on commerce, due to the sheer volume and weight of traffic. This is a major fear in South East Asia, although less likely than another airspace denial incident.

If we look to another form of significant economic event, that of the fiscal crisis, there are significant consequences. Harvard Professor Niall Harvard made the gloomy prediction that: “The fiscal crisis seems to be out of control. The ‘big crossover’ is approaching when the U.S. spends more on debt service costs than on security, and historically that is the tipping point for any global power.”⁷⁶ This is recognized and the

⁷⁴ Andrew Porter, “David Cameron, End is in sight for Afghan mission,” *Daily Telegraph*, London, 15 Nov 2010.

⁷⁵ Cowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 455.

⁷⁶ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “No Defence against Double-Dip Recession, says Nouriel Roubini,” *Daily Telegraph*, London, 05 Sep 2010. (quoting Harvard Professor Niall Ferguson) Online edition <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> (accessed Sep 9, 2010).

National Security Strategy states the counter that the economy must grow and the deficit must be reduced.⁷⁷ However, actions do not currently match the words, with U.S.

Federal Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2) an example, there needs to be debate as to whether the global strategic consequences have been thought through, and how these might rebound on the U.S.⁷⁸

The actions required of the instruments of power defined by DIME and global strategic consequences need to appreciate each other, as directed by the National Security Council. This expansive appreciation of DIME does not change the whole of government decision making structure, just optimizes it. A new “Jointness” was proposed in the 2008 National Defense Strategy, one that seamlessly combines civil and military capabilities and options. It described that as a nation the U.S. must strengthen not only its military capabilities, but also reinvigorate other important elements of national power and develop the capability to integrate, tailor and apply these tools as needed.

The Department of Defense has since taken on many of these burdens, but there is no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise. One identified aim is to improve the ability to deploy civilian expertise rapidly, and continue to increase effectiveness by joining with organizations and individuals beyond government, an untapped resource with enormous potential. The National Defense Strategy recognizes that having these permanent civilian capabilities available and using them early could also make it less likely that military forces would need to be deployed in the first place.⁷⁹ This is a real

⁷⁷ NSS 2010, President Barack Obama, covering letter.

⁷⁸ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “QE2 Risks Currency Wars and the End of Dollar Hegemony,” *Daily Telegraph*, London, 1 Nov 2010. Online edition <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> (accessed Nov 10, 2010).

⁷⁹ NDS 2008, 18.

issue for the role of the military in the context of the CJCS questions posed to NDU, and an argument for the appropriate allocation of limited resources.

CHAPTER 5: RISK ANALYSIS

When writing on any subject Philip Crowl warns that one must be aware of the risk of an insight hardening into a predetermined conclusion before the analysis is complete.¹ In this document risk is defined in terms of potential for damage to national security combined with the probability of occurrence. Measurement of the consequences, should the underlying risk remain unaddressed, is important. Addressing risk is directly related to the availability and allocation of resources. In the National Defense Strategy the limitation of resources is recognized, and that the strategy must address how to assess, mitigate, and respond to risk.

Today, we are witnessing a period of even greater American economic travails, with much larger fiscal deficits and a level of debt that Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen has called a top national security threat. These are coupled with deep concern that not Japan and Germany, but less friendly powers – China in particular, perhaps Russia and others – may be poised to benefit from American decline.²

Armitage and Nye argue that in an era where allies and adversaries alike openly criticize U.S. policy,³ wise resource allocations are advisable. But Michael O’Hanlon warns that cutting the defense budget should not be an inherent goal; it should be a process of taking calculated risks in military capabilities and activities to help strengthen the future economic strength of the United States, and consequently enhance national security, over the long term.⁴

Nevertheless, there is growing recognition in the U.S. that the only way to answer deficit action plans is by considering the defense budget for further cuts. The military

¹ Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 454.

² Michael O’Hanlon, “Defense Budget and American Power: Careful Cuts can Save Money and Strengthen Long Term Security,” *The Washington Times*, November 16, 2010. Online edition <http://www.washingtontimes.com> (accessed Nov 18, 2010).

³ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 17.

⁴ O’Hanlon, “Defense Budget and American Power,” November 16, 2010.

changes and strategic risks that would follow from the execution of cuts become the measure of acceptability, with Michael O’Hanlon recommending a national debate about whether such risks are smart choices a key requirement.⁵ The debate should be free from emotion and to the point as President Barack Obama recognized, “Yet as we fight the wars in front of us, we must see the horizon beyond them.”⁶

It is this clear thinking and planning ahead that will lead to ultimate success in mitigating the risks in the strategic environment and the reality of the changing balance of power. Hedging is one approach identified in the National Defense Strategy that deals with changes in the strategic environment that might invalidate the assumptions that underpin the strategy, and addresses risks to the strategy to keep it from becoming obsolete.⁷

Horowitz and Shalmon offer that although it must be recognized that when programming it takes different amounts to generate different capabilities, an equally sized budget cut in one area might only entail small risks, while the same cut in another could generate enormous risks.⁸ The relative requirement for investment and avoidance of multiple small cuts runs counter to the hedging approach. It is better to cut a whole capability than to attrite it with small cuts, although this depends on the capability, as they discussed below:

In theory, because the largest input in land forces is personnel, expenditure can be broken down to the level of individual soldiers; if you spend half of a given amount, you could still generate half of the capability. By contrast,

⁵ O’Hanlon, “Defense Budget and American Power,” November 16, 2010.

⁶ NSS 2010, President Barack Obama, covering letter.

⁷ NDS 2008, 20.

⁸ Michael Horowitz and Dan Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” Philadelphia, PA: *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, Elsevier Ltd, Spring 2009, 314.

many capital-intensive military platforms, like carriers, bombers, and advanced fighters, are all-or-nothing investments.⁹

The National Defense Strategy identifies efficiency as a key driver, with the imperative to invest in hedging against the loss or disruption of traditional advantage, and ensuring that such capabilities are applicable across multiple mission areas.¹⁰

Throughout this process Michael O’Hanlon says it is important to remain cognizant of the fact that military capabilities only have meaning in relation to the capabilities of other states or actors,¹¹ and the resultant impact on other states/actors actions.

This interdependence encompasses both conflictive and cooperative interactions among states.¹² With increased international economic interdependence a reality, European experts identify that in conflictive interactions, it has probably affected the mode of warfare, especially its duration, more than the war-making capacity of states.¹³ It also means that it has become more difficult to identify what is an attack. In a positive cooperative context, Armitage and Nye offer that working with others must always benefit the United States as well.¹⁴

In this light, the National Defense Strategy states that challenges require resourcefulness and an integrated approach that wisely balances risks and assets, recognizes areas for improvement, and where others are better suited to help implement aspects of the strategy.¹⁵ Security using collective interdependence is by its very nature more efficient, and balances risk potentially more effectively. Milan Vego offers that it is

⁹ Horowitz and Shalmon, “The Future of War,” 314.

¹⁰ NDS 2008, 22.

¹¹ O’Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 23.

¹² Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 168.

¹³ Ibid., 178.

¹⁴ Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 13.

¹⁵ NDS 2008, 19.

this balance of risk that is important, and if the resources are inadequate, the scale of the strategic objective must be reduced.¹⁶

U.K. National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review

In the U.K., in common with the growing realization in the U.S., it is recognized that the ability to meet current and future threats is directly impacted by the requirement to deal with the budget deficit, a point recognized in the U.K. National Security Strategy which states that national power depends on the economic security of the country.¹⁷ However, to have an international role is more than to have a commercial balance sheet as previously discussed when considering the economic instrument of power.¹⁸

In order to secure the safety and prosperity of the U.K., Bernard Jenkin of the U.K. Public Administration Committee says it is critical that the government relearn the lost art of national strategy.¹⁹ In an attempt to achieve this, the new U.K. National Security Strategy will be reported on annually to Parliament, and a Strategic Defence and Security Review will be conducted every five years. This aligns broadly with the existing U.S. approach.

The U.K. National Security Strategy recognizes the geographic realities are that whilst Britain is an island, economically and politically it is a vital link in the global network. It identifies that openness brings great opportunities, but also vulnerabilities.²⁰ The current age is identified as an age of unparalleled opportunity, but in order to protect interests at home, influence must be projected abroad. The core values of democracy, free speech, tolerance and human rights also have their place.

¹⁶ Vego, *Part I: Fundamentals, Joint Operational Warfare*, I-45.

¹⁷ U.K. National Security Strategy, October 2010, Foreword.

¹⁸ Page 46.

¹⁹ U.K. Public Administration Committee, Bernard Jenkin, 18 Oct 2010.

²⁰ U.K. NSS 2010, Foreword.

All of the above require the ability to project power and use a unique network of alliances and partnerships – principally with the United States of America, but also as a member of the European Union and NATO, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The identified need to maintain the capability to act well beyond home shores and to work with allies to have a strategic presence requires investment of resources.

However, as identified by Professor Michael Clarke, the director of the London based Royal United Services Institute, there is a difference between fielding forces that are efficient and cost-effective, and forces that are strategically significant. There are some deep concerns that the U.K. may be pursuing efficiency over strategic significance, having conducted a Treasury driven review. If it proves to be true, it will have significant implications for the U.K.'s role on the world stage.²¹ Experts state that it is a truism that national military potential is also determined by the composition, as distinct from the level of output.²²

Decision making is addressed in the formation of the National Security Council to bring together key Ministers, military and intelligence chiefs. It is intended to meet weekly and drive a culture of change in Whitehall, to ensure that limited resources are deployed to best effect.

More emphasis will be placed on identifying emerging risks and dealing with them before they become crises, by drawing together all instruments of national power. Diplomacy, development and intelligence will contribute to national security to ensure that the sum of the effort is greater than its constituent parts. The defence programme will also be brought back into balance.

²¹ Thomas Harding, "Defence Review a 'Lost Opportunity', Survey Shows," *Daily Telegraph*, London, 29 Oct 2010. Online edition <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> (accessed Nov 10, 2010).

²² Goldman and Sjöstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 172.

U.S. Strategy

The development of U.S. strategy based on threat projections, fiscal limitations or the best combination of both, an efficient, value for money, risk aware solution, is always the aspiration. If we first address the purpose of the military as stated we can see the first insight into what threat spectrum it is designed to face. As stated in the 2002 Annual Report to Congress, “The purpose of the U.S. armed forces is to protect and advance U.S. national interests and, if deterrence fails, to defeat threats to those interests.”²³

This purpose is clear and unambiguous. It gives the military concise guidance as to what to prepare for. However, the strategy to deal with emerging threats must remain dynamic and realistic, denial or lesson learning from one war, or type of war, rather than many whilst ignoring strategic trends should be avoided. It must also include the changing realities blurring the edges of war. The National Defense Strategy states that, “We must consider which non-lethal actions constitute an attack on our sovereignty, and which may require the use of force in response.”²⁴ Context is everything in these scenarios, with potential adversaries honoring what they perceive as the red-lines as they grow in strength. An example of the growth of others and their need to secure their interests are the Chinese:

Three warships sailed through the straits of Malacca in December last year, enroute to a milestone in recent Chinese history. Joining the United Nations-backed international force in the Gulf of Aden, China sought to protect its global economic interests with military power for the first time.²⁵

²³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Protection Joint Functional Concept*, Version 1.0, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 Jun 2004, 17.

²⁴ NDS 2008, 12.

²⁵ Jonathon Holsag, “Embracing Chinese Security Ambitions,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 32:3 (July 2009): 105.

This example of the changing threat landscape should now drive the posture of the military. Scenario based planning heavily focused on threats is a robust solution, and the U.S. Department of Defense moved to it in 2007. The concept of deterrence mentioned previously in the purpose statement above is defined as follows: “Strategic Deterrence is the prevention of aggression or coercion by adversaries that could threaten vital interests of the U.S. and/or our national survival.” It has the core ability to prevent an adversary’s actions, inextricably linking protection and deterrence.²⁶

However, we have already seen in history how Nuclear Deterrence has little effect on limited wars due to its escalatory qualities, where as previously the balance of two superpowers had greater effect. Conventional Deterrence could be seen as the causal foundation for asymmetric warfare, where for the smaller actor, there is no other champion; previously the USSR fulfilled that role. Everett Dolman concludes that this combination of effects suggests that the problem with such a view is that it suggests power is inefficient if it induces others to find new ways to engage the state.²⁷ However, even though the likelihood of interstate conflict has declined in recent years, it is to be ignored at our peril. The National Defense Strategy concludes that an edge must be maintained in conventional forces.²⁸

This problem where deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, can be too effective is the reality of today. It is not however the reality of tomorrow. The emerging BRIC²⁹ powers are examples of nations that could challenge, at least regionally, the conventional

²⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept*, Version 0.35, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Dec 2003, 5.

²⁷ Everett C. Dolman, “U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” *The SAIS review of International Affairs* Vol. XXVI, no.1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 167.

²⁸ NDS 2008, 13.

²⁹ BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India and China.

might of the U.S., using a combination of nuclear, conventional and asymmetric means. In 2004 it was assessed that the threat to U.S. forces in the 2015 timeframe would continue to be that of regional powers as they seek to dominate their regions,³⁰ although non-state actors cannot be dismissed.

As recent events have made clear, future adversaries faced with the near omnipotence of a deployed U.S. military will seek to threaten the centers of gravity of the U.S., its allies, and its friends. DODs protection responsibilities are thus essential to the continuance of the Nation's way of life, its political institutions, and the source of its capacity to project all of the instruments of national power in support of its interests.³¹

Returning to the questions posed at the start of this paper we can assess how they are answered by the critical enquiry so far conducted. The answers should inform the post-war role of the military.

³⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Protection Joint Functional Concept*, Version 1.0, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 Jun 2004, 41.

³¹ Department of Homeland Security. *Joint Operating Concept*, Version 4.4, Colorado Springs, CO: 12 Dec 2003, 33.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

As stated in the National Defense Strategy, “The Department [of Defense] should also develop the military capability and capacity to hedge against uncertainty, and the institutional agility and flexibility to plan early and respond effectively alongside interdepartmental, non-governmental and international partners.”¹

The primary CJCS question to be addressed was, “What is the post-war role of the U.S. Military?”², and with the U.K. National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review now complete providing an indicator, what is the military role within national strategy required to face the future after the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns?

Included as a subset of this primary question were the following:

What is the proper use of military force?

(1) How can we ensure military force does not become an option of last resort?

(2) How can we ensure military force is applied in a precise and principled manner?

(3) How can we ensure an ongoing and iterative approach to matching strategy and policy when employing military force?

The primary question on the role of the use of force has been investigated in the context of future global balance of power; across the types of power from Hard, Soft, to Smart; and the instruments of power, Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic. Indicators have been sought from the U.K. as it also prepares to face the future, and strategy discussed. The questions can be answered in turn.

The role of the U.S. military in the post-war context is clear. It must provide military utility across all the elements of power as the instrument of choice. However, it must provide credible hard power to maintain nuclear and conventional deterrence.

¹ NDS 2008, 5.

² “Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Research Initiative for Academic Year (AY) 2010-11,” Memorandum for the President, National Defense University, 13 May 2010.

Experience shows that this may force adversaries to choose an asymmetric approach and avoid state on state conflict. Indeed, the U.S. military has adjusted well, learning significant lessons from recent conflicts in developing counters to asymmetric threats, moving well beyond the Cold War paradigm of state on state.

This form of asymmetric power blurs the lines of western acceptability of the role of the military in areas that can be seen as non-military. The indignation felt when the Chinese are exposed as using unconventional methods is purely a western phenomenon, the proper use of military force is whatever the nation deems necessary to achieve its objectives. It is important to underscore that this must still remain guided by sound moral principles. The rest of the world sits in admiration of Chinese burgeoning power, and sees western objections to their methods as attempting to limit their influence.

The answers to the three sub-questions directly follow from this role statement. Firstly, the application of the military should not be assumed automatically as the last resort, but as General David Petraeus said, it is as much about restraint in the use of force as destruction of the enemy.³ The military should be utilized as the highly resourced instrument of national power that it is in all the elements of diplomacy, information and economics. It is this pervasiveness that is an intrinsic quality of the military, primarily derived from its global presence and access that gives the other elements of national power the ability to posture as the hegemonic tentacles that they are.

Secondly, military force when applied in this manner, can be very precise. When fully integrated with the other elements of national power, it is well informed and tuned to the conditions it will face. This “Warring States” Sun Tzu strategic tradition is the single most important thing to learn from the rise of China. The application of this force

³ O’Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power*, 2.

should remain principled, and in fact must, as the U.S. practices what it preaches. This may be the most important way to mitigate the traditional anti-hegemonic pretext that would be the continued adversarial counter.

Thirdly, to ensure that the strategy matches the policy in the employment of military force, is simply to understand the military's role as first stated. Grand strategy was defined by B H Liddell Hart as the purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community.⁴ It shares elements with foreign policy, but it primarily addresses political direction of the military instrument of national power. The real challenge is to achieve balance among policy, resources and capabilities.⁵

It is at the strategic level, not the tactical level, that wars are won or lost. Strategic objectives should not be cluttered with detail, but should be simple, concise and clearly articulated. Milan Vego states that the Clausewitzian theories of the relationship between policy and strategy and the nature of war are still valid today, and the desired strategic end state should be stated in broad terms across all instruments of national power.⁶ This will involve significant continued military capital in reaching out to agencies from the other instruments of diplomacy, information and economics to offer to contribute where and when it can to the national objectives.

U.S. Recommendations

In the discussion of instruments of power, it could be said that DIME⁷ is interesting, but Diplomacy is the 'sine qua non'. The rest, within reason, should fall into place. That

⁴ Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 322.

⁵ Chris Parry, "Without Agile, Balanced Forces, We Will Be Left Behind in the World," *Daily Telegraph*, London, 24 February 2010. Online edition <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> (accessed Feb 24, 2010).

⁶ Vego, *Part I: Fundamentals, Joint Operational Warfare*, I-50.

⁷ DIME: Diplomatic; Information; Military; Economic instruments of power.

said, the military has a clear future role as a key driver across DIME in the geopolitical context. The U.S. department of State's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, "Leading Through Civilian Power" makes progress addressing this issue, although some in the Interagency Community argue that it is the militarization of foreign policy.

The military, as the most highly resourced U.S. entity, equipped with significant planning and coordinating staff, should not expect other government departments to flesh out the strategy to implement the stated policies. The military has a clear role in helping articulate national security strategy whatever the instrument. This does not require adding further interagency partner personnel to Combatant Commands; it does mean putting military people out into those agencies in greater numbers to leverage the military to support the agency to which they are seconded. While placement of military officers with the right host agencies may not be easy, experience shows that they can be extremely effective once placed. In all but non-discretionary wars, the military role is variable, ranging from the primary instrument, to being a supporting one. In a rather less hegemonic world, it must further adapt to this reality.

Reliance on national decision making and the reality of relatively low level coordination, both typically in crisis settings, does not allow long-range planning. The Washington D.C. agency and department institutional cultures require strong leadership and a national strategic planning capability now more than ever. What is required is a well led decision making structure informed by a sound grand strategy, supported by a national strategic planning capability and an ability to support high tempo operations.

As an indicator, Chris Parry, writing in the London Daily Telegraph, recommended the following U.K. approach:

[T]he Government needs to put in place what is often described as a “grand” strategy – a joined up, comprehensive approach to determining U.K.’s interests. Defence capability does not exist in isolation: it translates directly into political, diplomatic and economic influence.⁸

Richard Haas, writing in Foreign Affairs, recommends that strategic planning should address the lack of U.S. energy policy, which looms large in the changing dynamics of modern hegemony,⁹ bringing with it a significant security burden. Barry Posen, writing in *International Security*, postulates that losing military control of the sea and the air, the “global commons”, would render U.S. global strategy outmoded in an instant.¹⁰ While, this security burden must be reduced, there is little appetite for increasing the budget of the U.S. military. Indeed, the reality of fiscal pressure and other important drivers already show a reduction in resourcing, and it is in these difficult times that the U.S. Military must judge well where to advise Congress to invest.

Although the U.S. national security budget is in decline, it can still find appropriate balance across the instruments of power while minimizing the impact to the pervasive requirements of the military, and maximizing its role in a new kind of power. This leads to the question; What type of power is next? It has become clear that a simple reduction of power to two types, hard and soft, may be too simplistic in the modern complex context. The ‘Great Game’, a term used for the competition between the empires of Britain and Russia in the 19th century, was often focused on diplomatic and military

⁸ Chris Parry, “Without Agile, Balanced Forces, We Will Be Left Behind in the World,” *Daily Telegraph*, London, 24 February 2010. Online edition <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> (accessed Feb 24, 2010).

⁹ Haas, “The Age of Non-Polarity,” 4.

¹⁰ Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, 28:1 (2003): 5-46.

maneuvers in Afghanistan. The Great Game is emerging once again on a global scale between the U.S., China and other regional powers. The U.S. already finds itself exercising a new kind of power for a new global condition.

In this new condition, real intentions are increasingly more difficult to discern. The maintenance and fluctuations in the balance of power are becoming for the first time truly inclusive and global in nature. Influences and interests of the 'Great Powers' can now be once or twice removed from their actions. This calls for a more refined use of the instruments of national power, in a less blunt manner, ideally less symbolic of aggressive intent. All instruments must be more agile and therefore more responsive to political direction, providing influence where others cannot go.

Continuing with this concept is the related idea of information deterrence, where the concept of an 'information umbrella' is an extension of the concept of a nuclear weapons umbrella. This concept holds that in the information age, information superiority has a similar deterrent role, dependant on the information being the truth. Theorists have already begun describing an 'Age of Wisdom', a natural progression beyond the 'Knowledge Age'; the military has a key role here.

In terms of a new direction for alliance, a geographically optimized approach may be more fruitful than the current U.S. practice of "the art of the possible" when forming coalitions. This approach would take greater advantage of naturally occurring permanent opportunities. It was no accident that the British colonized strategically important points in the world, ultimately resulting in the Commonwealth. Continued adaptation of the Commonwealth, which shares common values with the U.S., and an inclusive approach, may provide an option for like minded countries to cooperate across the DIME elements

of power. It could be a relationship grown and based on the bedrock of the U.S. led ‘five eyes’ community of AUS, CAN, U.K., U.S., and NZ.

When considering the strategic relationship of ‘ends, ways and means’, a transformational national security strategy should not only be resource driven but also holistic and moving in the direction stated in the National Military Strategy which states: “Transformation requires a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments – adjustments that reward innovation and creativity.”¹¹ Grand Strategy should be supported by a Comprehensive Approach; it is not a choice but a natural synergy, and among the most vital capabilities is the U.S. Defense Establishment. Said another way, this is the post-war world, and therefore defines the role of the U.S. Military: the balanced, agile, affordable, and reliable institution that is a proactive entity across all the domains of National Power.

¹¹ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, March 2004, iv.

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VITA

Lt Col Phil M. Kelly RM most recently served as the senior strike fighter pilot with the U.K. Carrier Strike Group, contributing to group development as the U.K. moves towards introduction of the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers. Commissioned in 1994 at the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, following this initial training he joined 40 Commando Royal Marines and served as a troop commander in Northern Ireland. Specialization as a fighter pilot followed, qualifying on the Sea Harrier FA2 deploying on all three U.K. carriers. Subsequent conversion to the Harrier GR9A resulted in multiple tours over four years based in Kandahar, Afghanistan. On posting to the U.K. Permanent Joint Headquarters, London, he was immediately seconded to E.U. Force Chad/Central African Republic for the run up to the E.U. Force Initial Operational Capability in Western Darfur, and on return worked in the Lessons Learned arena with particular focus on current conflicts. Lt Col Kelly was selected for command and attended Commanding Officer designate, but U.K. defense cuts removed the squadron. As a result he was assigned to the Joint Forces Staff College for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. Conversion to the F/A-18E 'Super Hornet' with the U.S. Navy is scheduled for summer 2011 in order to aid introduction of the new Queen Elizabeth class Royal Navy carriers. Lt Col Kelly is a graduate of Queen's University Belfast having read Aeronautical Engineering and an MSc in Computer-Aided Mechanical Engineering Design. He speaks conversational Spanish and limited French.

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